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This paper reports on themaking of an interactive demo to illustrate
algorithmic bias in facial recognition. Facial recognition technology
has been demonstrated to be more likely to misidentify women
and minoritized people. This risk, among others, has elevated facial
recognition into policy discussions across the country, where many
jurisdictions have already passed bans on its use. Whereas scholar-
ship on the disparate impacts of algorithmic systems is growing,
general public awareness of this set of problems is limited in part
by the illegibility of machine learning systems to non-specialists.
Inspired by discussions with community organizers advocating
for tech fairness issues, we created the Face Mis-ID Demo to re-
veal the algorithmic functions behind facial recognition technology
and to demonstrate its risks to policymakers and members of the
community. In this paper, we share the design process behind this
interactive demo, its form and function, and the design decisions
that honed its accessibility, toward its use for improving legibility of
algorithmic systems and awareness of the sources of their disparate
impacts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Researchers have demonstrated significant racial and gender dispar-
ities in facial recognition performance. In particular, facial recog-
nition systems systematically misidentify women, people who are
Black, and especially Black women; in their study of three such
systems, Buolamwini and Gebru find that the error rate for darker-
skinned women’s faces was 34.7 percent, whereas for white men
it was only 0.8 percent [4]. A growing body of evidence affirms
these findings, indicating that facial recognition performs more
poorly among women and people of minoritized races and genders
[21, 32].
However, facial recognition performance disparities are less well-
known outside the academic community. While the general public
is aware of facial recognition technology, many are unfamiliar with
its risks to accuracy and fairness. Work by the Pew Research Center
in 2019 [34] shows broad public awareness of facial recognition
(with 87 percent of people surveyed knowing a little or a lot about
the technology); however, awareness of the technology changes
with respect to household incomes and by race, with poorer and
minoritized people (those most likely to be the subject of police
surveillance) expressing less familiarity with the technology. A
majority of people surveyed also believed that facial recognition
is effective at identifying individual people, assessing someone’s
gender, and assessing someone’s race [34]. This evidence illustrates
lower awareness among the general public of facial recognition
systems’ performance disparities with respect to race and gender.
Notably, the wider dissemination of public scholarship like the
2020 documentary Coded Bias may shift this awareness; the work
we present here aims to complement such public scholarship by
allowing for interactive exploration of concepts in the film.
A vast number of public and private services are becoming medi-
ated by machine learning algorithms; making the risks and failures
of these systems more legible could help to temper public expecta-
tions and raise critical questions as to their appropriateness. This
goal has inspired a new wave of accessible resources to demys-
tify algorithmic systems, including the Digital Defense Playbook
by the Our Data Bodies Project [24], the Watching the Watchers
workshops by the Coveillance Collective,1 and the A to Z of AI by
the Oxford Internet Institute.2 However, few of these accessible
resources focus on critiquing facial recognition specifically, nor
how facial recognition performs disparately across race and gender.
In this work, we set out to illustrate and make accessible con-
temporary findings on facial recognition performance disparities
to a broader public irrespective of their technical background. We
report on the creation of a pedagogical tool called the Face Mis-ID
Demo, named for the way it sets out to illustrate mis-identification
in facial recognition systems. First, we describe related work on
making technical matters more accessible to general audiences.
Next, we provide background on facial recognition as a policy issue
and the local policy context to which our work responds. We then
present the process that led to the Face Mis-ID Demo, the demo
itself, feedback from our partners and other activist and advocacy
organizations from which we elicited input, and the design deci-
sions that aimed to increase its accessibility and usefulness as a
teaching tool. In the discussion we describe how supporting non-
specialist knowledge and understanding of algorithmic risks and
harms can play a meaningful role in the responsible implementation
(or prohibition) of algorithmic systems long-term.
2 RELATEDWORK
We draw on work describing how to communicate uncertainty to
non-specialist users, opacity of algorithms, non-specialist under-
standing of algorithms, and resources to make algorithmic systems
more accessible and legible.
2.1 Foregrounding uncertainty
Researchers inHCI, statistical communication, and psychology have
sought to better communicate statistical concepts like numerical
uncertainty to non-experts [37]. When the uncertainty in a model’s
assessment is not made explicit, some users could perceive such
systems to be unerring and more authoritative. Previous work
has developed visualizations that more unambiguously convey the
underlying probabilities of events [17, 20], helping to moderate user
expectations about likelihood and accuracy.
1https://coveillance.org/
2https://atozofai.withgoogle.com/intl/en-US/. See also the Critical Platform Studies
Group’s A to Z of UAVs at https://critplat.org/2020/12/11/the-a-z-of-uavs/.
2.2 Non-specialist understanding of
algorithmic systems
Algorithmic systems are opaque due to multiple factors, including
trade secret, technical unfamiliarity, and the complexity of machine
learning and related techniques [5] requiring “algorithmic literacy”
to understand [29]. Moreover, these models employ logic that is
not reliably intelligible to humans [8]. Previous work finds that
they are especially illegible to non-specialists, even to government
employees responsible for their use [40]. Instead, users form their
own beliefs about how algorithms work [27]. These beliefs may not
adhere closely to the way an algorithm works [13]. Nevertheless,
lay understandings or “folk theories” of algorithms [9, 10] shape
user behavior [25]. For instance, advanced users try to leverage
what they understand about how a systemworks in order to achieve
more visibility on social media feeds [2, 3, 7].
Previous work suggests that many people have high expectations
for the power and potential of algorithmic technologies. Zhang and
Dafoe [42] find that survey respondents hold strong beliefs about
the impending arrival of “super intelligent” artificial intelligence
whose capabilities will dwarf human reasoning. Some scholars
attribute this enthusiasm in part to inflated marketing pitches of
technology firms, who make claims about the capabilities of AI that
are, at best, overly optimistic [6, 23, 28]. Work like this underscores
the need to raise awareness about the limitations of algorithmic
capabilities.
2.3 Intelligible and explainable AI
Scholars have set out to make algorithmic systems less opaque
through interpretablemachine learning [30, 42]. However, this work
is primarily aimed at improving legibility for the data scientists
who use models; less often for end-users. Researchers have also
explored the benefits of textual explanations to this end; for example,
of what, how, or why a newsfeed algorithm performed as it did [26].
One influential approach provides counterfactual explanations to
describe to end-users what set of circumstances would result in a
different algorithmic decision, such as in the scenario of applying
for a loan [38] or explanations of how a particular personalized
ad was shown to a specific user [12]. Some work has explored the
potential for regulation to mandate such explanations [33]. Amid
growing interest in this area, researchers call for further application
of methods found in HCI toward more user-centered design of these
tools [18].
2.4 Accessible resources and interactive tools
Responding to algorithmic opacity and its consequences, researchers
and practitioners are creating a range of toolkits and explanatory
resources to make AI more understandable to non-specialists. For
example, the “AI Blindspots” toolkit aims to help software devel-
opers build better systems through prompts and probes that can
foreground potential pitfalls related to AI development and data
use [1]. The World Economic Forum provides a set of learning
modules designed to assist corporate executives in making respon-
sible AI strategy and governance decisions [39]. The “Emerging
Police Technology Policy Toolkit” is a resource designed to assist
decision-makers within police departments in identifying best prac-
tices when acquiring new technologies [35]. Many of the aforemen-
tioned resources are aimed at decision-makers; the Digital Defense
Playbook from the Our Data Bodies project is intended for grass-
roots activists and community members. Another resource aimed
at end-users is distinctive in that it is interactive and pedagogical;
called “How Normal Am I,” it is a facial recognition demo that lets
users experience AI decision-making by scanning their own faces
through a webcam using various “off the shelf” algorithms to pro-
duce predictions about the user’s attractiveness, age, gender, body
mass index, life expectancy, and emotion [31].
We draw inspiration from previous work on improving non-
specialist understanding of machine learning. In a similar manner
to the How Normal Am I demo, we focus on how to make fa-
cial recognition more legible to end-users, and compare these two
demos in the discussion. We further focus on how to design peda-
gogical tools that make such systems’ inaccuracy most salient to
end-users—drawing a distinction from work in explainability that
justifies systems’ decisions rather than highlighting their failures.
3 BACKGROUND
As part of the growing national debate about the uses of facial
recognition software, activists have pushed for greater oversight,
and outright prohibition, of the technology at the city-level. Several
cities, including Boston, Massachusetts; Oakland, and San Fran-
cisco, California; and Portland, Maine have banned the use of fa-
cial recognition by government agencies,3 while Portland, Oregon
has gone farther by banning facial recognition by both govern-
ment and business entities [15]. Though a ban on facial recognition
technology is not in place in Seattle, Washington, where our re-
search was conducted, Seattle’s ordinance regulating government
use of surveillance technology was called one of the strongest in
the United States by the ACLU. As a result of the efforts of a coali-
tion of local activists, Seattle’s surveillance ordinance requires a
significant degree of community input regarding government ac-
quisition and use of surveillance technologies. The channels for
public engagement and review afforded by the ordinance have in-
creased community awareness of algorithmic surveillance systems
in particular, including facial recognition, potentially contributing
to meaningful community participation and oversight.
In February 2019, we partnered with the Washington state chap-
ter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to support their
work. This organization works in concert with the Seattle Tech
Equity Coalition, a group of other local race and social justice orga-
nizations that collaborate with ACLU on technology policy issues.
The Coalition wanted to better understand the technical dimension
of the risks posed by surveillance technologies in use by local gov-
ernment. Together we decided to focus on the algorithmic harms
of surveillance technologies based on conclusions from our prior
work that found attention to algorithmic bias is absent from exist-
ing surveillance oversight processes [40]. This shared focus began
a 1.5 year initiative to support ACLU Washington and the Tech
Equity Coalition’s work with a set of explanatory resources known
as the Algorithmic Equity Toolkit [19, 22]; here we introduce the
3https://www.banfacialrecognition.com/map/
Face Mis-ID Demo, designed to be a standalone artifact from this
broader project.
4 METHODS
It is into this policy context we conducted a participatory design
process with three partnering advocacy organizations. Our work
was led by the question, “How can the disparate performance of
facial recognition systems by race and gender be made accessible to
a non-specialist audience, especially for use in policy and advocacy
work?” Here, we report on the community partnerships and design
process in pursuit of this guiding question that led to an interactive
tool, the Face Mis-ID Demo. We drew on community-based design
methods, in which we produced prototypes and brought them back
iteratively to partners for feedback. Once we had a fully functional
prototype, we piloted the tool with panels of additional race and
social justice organizers using the Diverse Voices method [41], as
described in the Pilot section.
4.1 Partnering organizations
We worked with three partner advocacy organizations: (i) ACLU
Washington, our aforementioned primary partner; (ii) Densho, an
organization dedicated to preserving the history of World War II
incarceration of Japanese Americans and advocating to prevent
state violence in the future; and (iii) the Council on American-
Islamic Relations of Washington, a prominent civil liberties group
defending the rights of American Muslims.
By June 2019, we gained support for this project from the Uni-
versity of Washington eScience Institute within its Data Science for
Social Good program, where it was incubated over Summer 2019.
We assembled a team of student fellows, data scientists, and inter-
pretive social scientists to create tools to support our community
partners’ work. Through the collaborative work that followed, we
drew inspiration from calls to broaden the epistemic frame of the
data science discipline by integrating the “situated knowledge” of
affected communities into data science research and development
[14, 19]. In the case of the Face Mis-ID Demo, that meant designing
a tool for the specific local policy context where the municipal
government was seeking input from local advocacy organizations
and the public.
4.2 Design process
We met weekly with representatives of one of our three partner
organizations for 12 weeks to refine our initial design goals:
(1) Support our partners’ ongoing policy advocacy work;
(2) Illustrate previous findings on how facial recognition per-
forms more poorly with respect to race and gender;
(3) Communicate these insights for a non-technical audience;
(4) Communicate engagingly using an interactive pedagogical
tool;
(5) Collaborate and incorporate feedback from our community
partners.
As previously mentioned, the Demo was a standalone part of a
larger 1.5 year effort to create explanatory resources on algorithmic
harm for partners [19, 22]; over the course of the design process we
refined our initial goals in response to partners’ advice and needs, ul-
timately focusing on facial recognition. Iterative prototypes worked
Figure 1: Face Mis-ID Demo returning no matches
to improve the accessibility and clarity of this message as it related
to the demo’s design and functionality and report on these design
decisions below. We also conducted 3 pilot sessions of 4-7 people
each using the Diverse Voices method [41]. Each panel featured
civil rights advocates from additional organizations with which we
did not have ongoing partnerships.
4.3 Pedagogical stance
Our team was inspired by the goal that the interactive demo would
be a teaching tool for use in policy advocacy settings. In particular,
we hoped to create a resource that our partner organizations could
use to illustrate facial recognition failures to the communities they
serve or directly to policymakers. We decided on an interactive tool
in order to support exploration and interrogation of facial recogni-
tionmatch scores by users and to provide more detailed illustrations
by which they might reach their own conclusions. However, as is
clear by the name selected for the Demo, we followed the sentiments
of our partners by not assuming a neutral stance regarding facial
recognition technology. While pedagogy is indeed a goal in present-
ing the demo, we do not make an assumption that the acceptance or
rejection of controversial technologies is due simply to the public’s
lack of information, nor that public skepticism of a technology can
be written off as a failure to understand it—a stance critiqued as a
“deficit model” of public understanding of science [36]. Scientific
literacy indeed plays an important role in shared governance of
technical systems, but literacy alone does not guarantee reflective
and responsible technology practices. Rather than pursue literacy
alone, the Face Mis-ID Demo conveys a critical pedagogical stance.
We set out not only to illuminate how a controversial technical
system works, but to foreground the normative questions that have
been raised and to make explicit both the technical and conceptual
challenges of facial recognition.
5 PRESENTING THE DEMO
Our design process resulted in the Face Mis-ID Demo, a website
at <https://facemisid.herokuapp.com> featuring an interactive tool
that illustrates previous work on facial recognition systems’ per-
formance disparities with respect to race and gender. To interact
with the Demo, a user selects the image of a public figure, such as
LeBron James, chooses a match threshold, and is returned results of
the most similar faces in the dataset, along with a similarity score.
As the user interacts with the Demo, they encounter faces that at
the current threshold are assessed by the algorithm to be the same
as that of the public figure selected. Yet, often the faces identified as
matches by the algorithm are different people. In this way, general
patterns of how facial recognition systems fail are rendered more
observable.
Importantly, our design also foregrounds the role system oper-
ators (e.g. police officers) play in the ultimate accuracy of facial
recognition AI. Modeling a key design decision in real world imple-
mentations, Demo users can adjust accuracy thresholds. Thereby,
users can witness how changing accuracy thresholds has varying
performance across differences in race and gender. Placing our
Demo user in the role of tuning the accuracy of facial recogni-
tion AI proved to be a pedagogically strong choice: Demo users
quickly understood how seemingly tiny alterations to the numeric
thresholds impacted system performance unevenly with respect to
differences in race and gender.
5.1 Choosing a public figure subject
The interactive portion of the Face Mis-ID Demo is comprised of
three segments – current subjects, threshold, and current matches.
Under current subjects users can select an image of a public figure
(that is, a celebrity) from one of nine subjects available.
5.2 Setting a match threshold
After selecting a subject, users are able to manipulate a thresh-
old slider, choosing a value between 0.0 and 1.4 in increments of
0.1. This threshold slider represents the minimum similarity score
necessary for two images to be considered a match. As users manip-
ulate the threshold, the third segment of the Demo, current matches,
is altered in real-time. Current matches shows eight images, one of
which is a different photo of the subject. This different photo of
the subject is outlined in green to signify that it is the only true
match. The other seven photos are of different public figures and
are thus false positives. Under each current match image is the simi-
larity score between that image and the current subject. As the user
increases the minimum threshold necessary for a match, images
under current matches whose similarity scores do not meet this min-
imum threshold fade to black. As the user alters the threshold and
the number of false positives changes, a line of text under threshold
informs the user of the number of mismatches at the user’s chosen
threshold. As the user manipulates the threshold, the number of
false positives changes.
5.3 Orienting the user
The interactive portion of the Demo is prefaced by explanatory
text. At the outset, users are presented with a description of the
purpose and goals of the tool, terms to know, instructions for use,
and questions to consider. Under “Purpose,” we provide a bare-bones
definition of facial recognition, and outline the key illustrations of
the Demo – namely, that matching with facial recognition relies
on user-chosen thresholds and that facial recognition software
systematically performs poorly on people of color, women, and
most starkly Black women. Under “Terms to Know,” we define the
terms similarity score, threshold, false positive, true positive, and
false negative and then provide a numbered list of instructions for
use. Finally, we offer the user a set of guiding questions to consider
as they interact the portion of the Demo. Throughout the user’s
interaction and as theymanipulate the threshold, text alerts the user
to the changing proportion of mismatches both across all possible
subjects and within each subject. Importantly, this text allows users
to compare how the accuracy of the system at the same match score
varies across subjects.
5.4 Technical development process
The machine learning functionality underlying the demo is in-
tended to provide a lightweight teaching illustration of findings
by Buolamwini and Gebru [4] on the disparate performance of
facial recognition systems. Rather than create a working replica of
a system trained on thousands of images, the Demo was intended
to emulate similar match scores using a small number of images as
a pedagogical tool—and in observance of the privacy and ethical
implications of using large face image datasets.
To develop the Demo, we used OpenFace (an open source fa-
cial recognition implementation based on Google’s FaceNet deep
learning algorithm) as our identification algorithm; also referred to
as a “1-to-N” search algorithm. We implemented the image iden-
tification algorithm on a 72-image dataset curated by our team
for the purpose of communicating how classification errors vary
with respect to race and gender. OpenFace provided several key
benefits. First, it is an open source framework, whereas most facial
recognition algorithms used in the private sector and from software
vendors are proprietary and not available for use in this context.
Second, among open source facial recognition toolkits, OpenFace
has been argued to have the highest accuracy in face identification
[11]. Third, OpenFace is a pre-trained model, which was necessary
given that our intention was not to devote time and computational
power to creating, training, or refining facial recognition algorithms.
Rather, we aimed to illustrate system shortcomings and differential
performance, both of which are well-established in the literature
but inadequately communicated to non-specialists.
The dataset to which we applied OpenFace’s algorithm was
composed of images of public figures from the Labeled Faces in
the Wild Dataset (LFW). LFW is a public database of 13,233 labeled
human face images of public figures collected from the web [16].
Using LFW, we curated two small image datasets using a process
described below that would be useful for our purposes without
imposing the computational burden or ethical issues of using the
entire original LFW database. We curated two datasets for our
demo: one for image “search” and one for the “gallery”, part of
which is visible on the user interface. We chose a search dataset
to consist of 10 images of public figures, which corresponded to
our “current subjects” in the Demo. These were the images for
which we were searching for a match in the gallery dataset. Using
Wikipedia as a source, we identified that of these 10 public figures
7 were people of color and 3 were white; 3 were men and 7 were
women. We curated the second “gallery” dataset to contain 72 total
images — 10 of which were different photos of the public figures in
our search dataset, with the remaining 62 being additional public
figures not present in our search dataset. Thus, for each of the 10
current subjects in the Demo there existed one true match in the
gallery dataset and 71 false matches. In the gallery dataset, 34 of
the 72 images were of men and 38 were of women, while 33 were
of white individuals and 39 were of people of color. The images
we chose were for the purpose of creating a teaching demo and
not with the aim of replicating or providing further evidence for
the already well-validated findings from [4]. We ran each image in
the search dataset against each image in the gallery dataset, and
retrieved similarity scores for the 8 most similar gallery images for
each image in the search dataset. We built a user interface in Dash,
a Python framework for building web applications, and populated
it with these images and corresponding similarity scores.
When comparing two images, OpenFace predicts the similarity
between them by computing the squared L2 distance between the
mathematical representations of the images or faces. This similarity
score is on a scale from 0.0 to 4.0, with 0.0 indicating that the images
are identical, and 4.0 indicating they are not at all similar. Given
that for each search photo we only selected the 8 faces most similar
to it from the gallery dataset, the upper extreme of this scale was
not relevant to the Demo. After initial small pilots of the Demo, our
team understood that this decreasing scale was counter-intuitive
for non-expert users. To accommodate this, we transformed the
scale so that the greater the similarity score, the more similar two
images or faces were predicted to be.
6 DESIGN DECISIONS
6.1 Focus on threshold
Primarily, the Face Mis-ID Demo aims to convey that positive identi-
fications in a facial recognition system are not definitive, but rather
based on match thresholds designated by the system operator (such
as a police officer or investigator). The design of the Demo com-
municates this to the user by placing the match threshold on a
slider feature. This slider allows the user to manipulate the match
threshold, and observe how this choice affects what images are
considered to be a match. For example, an image with a similarity
score of 1.1 is a positive match when the match threshold is set at
1.09, but not when this similarity cutoff is raised. This feature helps
impart to users how face mis-identification works and the role that
the operator’s choices about match thresholds play in making false
positives possible.
Illustrating thematch threshold as operating on a continuum also
highlights how minute changes in the designated match threshold
result in large changes to outcomes. Note that setting the match
threshold at 0.9 instead of 1.0 is a seemingly minor change, yet this
distinction made the difference between Lisa Leslie being correctly
identified, or her being falsely identified with Jacqueline Edwards.
Together, these features are intended to impart to users the ease
with which mis-identification is possible in facial recognition tools;
all the more risky in high-stakes scenarios like law enforcement.
The design of the Demo also allows the user to select a match
threshold so high that it precludes even correct results. This aspect
of the design is intended to highlight that facial recognition tools
rely on a trade-off between system confidence and results returned;
no single threshold optimizes system performance to only return
true positive results. Allowing the user to raise system standards
to the point of failure further undermines the perception that these
systems are (or can be made) objective, in that users can see the
failure point of the system in action.
Figure 2: Face Mis-ID Demo Home Screen
6.2 Celebrity images
The FaceMis-ID Demo also set out to illustrate the disparate failures
of facial recognition to users across different demographic groups
and identities. For instance, a system that relied on user-submitted
images would likely demonstrate facial recognition failures for
minoritized users and women, but risk performing well enough
for user-submitted images from white men as to maintain their
confidence as to the accuracy of such systems for all users. Instead,
we set out to create a system that could be a useful pedagogical
tool irrespective of a user’s own identity and demographic factors.
A key design decision to illustrate the disparate performance
of these systems was to select ten examples of individuals from
different races and genders that users could use to compare system
performance. We believed that recognizable faces from celebrities
and other public figures would best orient users to the system’s
disparate performance, in that system failure would be immediately
recognizable. Therefore, we selected the following public figures
representing men and women (although notably not gender mi-
norities) from white, Black, Latin American, East Asian, and South
Asian backgrounds: athlete LeBron James, athlete Lisa Leslie, real-
ity star Paris Hilton, musician Jennifer Lopez, athlete Jacqueline
“Jackie” Edwards, astronaut Kalpana Chawla, athlete Jason Camp-
bell, anchor Katie Couric, and actress Vicki Zhao Wei. Intuitively,
we also wanted to emphasize that mis-identification was possible
with such widely-photographed and recognizable faces as these,
and that the same harms are possible and perhaps more likely with
people who are not celebrities.
6.3 Comparing mismatches across subjects
The system also allows users to compare the performance of a
single match threshold across subjects. This feature is essential
to demonstrating the disparate performance of the system across
demographic groups. For example, for the same match threshold
of 1.0, the system correctly matches for Paris Hilton and Aaron
Peirsol who are white, but produces 28% mismatches for LeBron
James, who is Black. Notably, this differential performance does not
solely fall along race and gender lines; at this threshold the system
correctly identifies Kalpana Chawla and Vicki Zhou Wei, and fails
to surface a match with Katie Couric. Note that we had selected an
image of Katie Couric’s face for our dataset that is slightly distorted
in order to reflect the imperfect nature of the images often fed to
facial recognition software in real-world settings.
6.4 Context and questions to consider
One challenge for non-specialists in understanding systems like
facial recognition is the accompanying (often obscure) technical
language. Thus, our aim with the text of the Demo was two-fold:
first, to convey our purpose, main points, and instructions in clear
and simple terms. Second, to ensure that users were equipped with
the vocabulary necessary not only to understand the Demo, but to
also understand and contribute to community conversations about
facial recognition technology. To this end, we list out five “terms to
know” at the outset of the Demo: similarity score, threshold, false
positive, true positive, and false negative.
We also provide a set of guiding questions for the user to con-
sider while using the Demo. These draw attention to specific failure
modes of the system; for instance, asking “What is the lowest thresh-
old at which the software correctly identifies Aaron Piersol’s face?”
We then ask the same question for LeBron James and Jacqueline
Edwards, respectively. In this, we hoped to further home in on the
distribution of false positives with respect to race, gender, and the
intersection of the two. In addition to highlighting such specific
cases, we also ask the user to consider whether even highly accurate
facial recognition software has a useful role in our society, given
its uses as a tool to surveil communities of color.
6.5 Pilot with expert panels
As an initial pilot we presented the Demo to three pilot panels
with activists from nine organizations whose advocacy spans race,
immigration, and rights of formerly incarcerated people. The orga-
nizations constituting these panels were distinct from our partner
organizations and we did not engage these organizations after the
panel sessions. Each panel had 4-7 participants. After using the
Demo, respondents expressed some range of concern about the
performance of facial recognition software. Reactions included pan-
elists saying, “that is crazy”, “I am peeved”, “I didn’t think it [facial
recognition] was this bad”, and asking if facial recognition is a tool
“that is currently being used...right now.”
Respondents also noted the Demo prompted them to question
the role of facial recognition technologies in the criminal justice
system. One panelist asked, “Does this [facial recognition] carry a
lot of weight? if it is determining someone’s life, why not just bring
hearsay back?”; another participant noted, “If [facial recognition]
is a kid’s toy then fine...but if you are making a decision [based on
facial recognition] then that’s not okay”; others mentioned that
using the demo prompted them to “think [about] the next steps, and
what the implications of this [facial recognition] are”. These quotes
indicate a concern about the possible consequences of inaccurate
assessments when these technologies are used in sensitive domains.
Our pilot with expert panels also led to some key design changes.
First, panelists signaled an interest in seeing not only how the
facial recognition algorithm performs for each potential subject,
but comparing, in tandem, the performance across all potential
subjects. Thus, we reconfigured the Demo to allow users to observe
at once the percent of mismatches across the ten possible current
subjects given the currently selected threshold. This change was
also intended to make more salient the disparate performance of
face recognition with respect to gender and race —for instance,
users were now able to see that at, say, a threshold of 0.5 Aaron
Peirsol is correctly identified, while LeBron James, Lisa Leslie, and
Jacqueline “Jackie” Edwards (all Black individuals) are the only
three potential subjects to have 100 percent mismatches at this
same threshold.
After users reported difficulty keeping track of changingmatches
as they manipulated the threshold, we introduced a fade-out effect
to create a cleaner, simpler visual encoding. Any images whose
similarity score did not meet the user’s selected minimum threshold
would fade into the background, allowing the user to focus on the
images that remained and compare the faces of those remaining
matches to the face of the current subject. To serve as a consistent
reminder to the user, we identified the one true positive match in
the Demo with a green outline.
7 DISCUSSION
The primary goal of the Face Mis-ID Demo was to improve non-
specialist understanding of algorithmic systems, in particular by
demonstrating the limitations of facial recognition. In our discus-
sion, first we reflect on how the Face Mis-ID Demo fared to this
end by evaluating how the Demo was received by activists in our
pilot panels and its limitations. Next, we compare the Face Mis-ID
Demo to another interactive tool intended for familiarizing non-
specialists with facial recognition – the European Union-funded
SHERPA project’s “How Normal Am I” demo.4 Finally, we call on
the community of AI ethics researchers to embrace pedagogical
tools within their scope of work as an important part of empower-
ing those most affected by AI systems.
7.1 Evaluating the Demo as a tool for
interrogating facial recognition
We find that the Demo was successful in communicating how fa-
cial recognition software can misidentify people. Although algo-
rithmic systems often benefit from the perception of objectivity,
participants in the pilot workshops expressed skepticism about the
capabilities of face recognition and referred to specific learning
from the Demo. One person shared their undermined confidence in
facial recognition, saying “When you think facial recognition, you
think, ‘That’s my face. I only have one face and unless I got some
serious modifications, that’s my face. But it is super inaccurate.”’
(Person 1, Advocates for formerly incarcerated people panel). Here,
the respondent speaks to how counter-intuitive facial recognition
failures are, given that faces are unique– and furthermore their
surprise that these systems would fail in the absence of drastic
changes to one’s appearance.
The Demo also engendered concerns of the uses of facial recogni-
tion technology and concern with its application in criminal justice
scenarios. For example, one person said,
“That’s crazy. If it’s not the person, then its not the
person... It depends on what this is used for. I always
thought it was 100% accurate. That’s not good... If
it’s a kids toy, then it’s fine. [But] you are making a
decision on that.” (Person 2, Advocates for formerly
incarcerated people panel).
Here, the respondent highlights the potential harms that could
result from the inaccuracies of facial recognition technology, espe-
cially in high-stakes scenarios. Another person added, “How much
weight does this carry? Hearsay doesn’t hold up in court. Does this
hold up in court? I didn’t think it was good, but I didn’t think it was
this bad” (Person 1, Advocates for formerly incarcerated people
panel). In this case, the Demo raised concerns about how the false
matches will be used in the criminal justice context and the irony
that other unreliable types of information are inadmissable in that
context.
A key goal in the Demo’s design was to convey how important
the match threshold is in system performance. Respondents in the
pilot did not speak at length about the match threshold; this may
indicate that the current design could be further developed toward
this goal. However, one person said of the matches, “Even the 100%
4https://www.hownormalami.eu
one was wrong” (Person 3, Advocates for formerly incarcerated
people panel). Here, when saying ‘100%’, the respondent is referring
to the maximum possible value for the match threshold, and notes
that the system fails even at this most selective threshold. This
comment suggests that the tool confers some skepticism that even
a high match threshold will deliver reliable results.
The pilot also revealed the Demo’s limitations. The current de-
sign requires users to manipulate the slider and to assess multiple
subjects in order to develop a sense for the system’s disparate im-
pact; this could be time consuming. In the advocacy, policy, and
grassroots activist settings for which we designed our Demo, this
time cost could diminish its effectiveness and ability to reach a
larger audience. While the Demo’s title, Face Mis-ID, does prime
users with the intended message of the system of face recognition
mis-identification, a user must interact with the Demo to see how
such inaccuracies are skewed toward women andminoritzed people.
Similarly, once a user is already concerned about facial recognition
technology, the Demo does not offer a clear call-to-action with
respect to how to proceed.
Future work would further evaluate and develop the Demo for
use situated within advocacy, policy, and grassroots awareness
efforts. The current version of the Demo was published in March
2020 at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic; this development
forestalled the team’s plan to further develop the tool via field
testing with specific advocates and campaigns. In the future, the
team hopes to explore the Demo’s usefulness in helping educate
lawmakers on the risks and harms of facial recognition systems as
part of larger campaigns to ban the use of this technology.
7.2 Comparing the Face Mis-ID Demo with a
similar project
Here we reflect on the FaceMis-ID Demo by comparing it to another
interactive tool also intended to acquaint non-specialist audiences
with facial recognition technology, called How Normal Am I. How
Normal Am I is a website with text that reads: “Experience how
‘artificial intelligence’ judges your face”. A button to begin the
demonstration shows a man speaking to the user, saying:
“Let’s talk about... machine learning algorithms that
judge your face. By giving access to your camera,
you’ll be able to experience these algorithms for your-
self” (How Normal Am I website).
Using a photo of the user’s face provided by their webcam, the demo
evaluates the user’s attractiveness, apparent age, gender, body mass
index, life expectancy, and emotions by producing scores and assess-
ments for each. In exploring online reactions to the How Normal
Am I demo5 we note that many users interpret the scores they re-
ceive from the tool as objective truth, especially determinations the
algorithm makes about users’ attractiveness. In using algorithms
to rate users’ physical appearance, the How Normal Am I demo
presents users with information that would be hard for them to
evaluate objectively. This design decision reifies a sense of algo-
rithms’ power and objectivity– in part because the notion of an
attractiveness score itself is sensitive and impossible to evaluate
in an impartial sense. This choice leaves the learning conferred
5https://www.reddit.com/r/InternetIsBeautiful/comments/ja37c3/ai_
judges_your_face_and_tells_you_how_normal_you/
by the How Normal Am I demo vulnerable to differences among
individual users’ self-esteem or self-perception.
The design of the Face Mis-ID Demo differs from the How Nor-
mal Am I demo in that it provides more objective assessments that
users can evaluate themselves. Specifically, matches provided by
the Face Mis-ID Demo are either correct or incorrect; it is evident
to a non-specialist user that the algorithm has misidentified Kobe
Bryant as Lisa Leslie, as opposed to whether an algorithm has
erred in its assessment of the user’s own attractiveness, apparent
age, gender, weight, or emotion. Moreover, across all of our pilot
workshops, users assigned responsibility for incorrect matches to
the algorithmic system– raising questions and interrogating the
technology rather than affirming its utility or objectivity.
7.3 A call for more resources to empower
non-specialists
This work is one example of an increasing number of non-technical
interventions into the AI ethics field to further empower non-
specialist with explanatory and pedagogical resources. Two de-
velopments of late have made increasing non-specialist awareness
more compelling and urgent. First, ordinances in various munici-
palities, including the city where this work was done, have created
channels for community input regarding government acquisition
and use of surveillance technologies. Second, lawmakers (elected by
community members) are being presented with an increasing num-
ber of opportunities to regulate and pass legislation on surveillance
technologies. Empowering non-specialists to ask better questions
about whether and how such systems should be used is a critical
intervention into both of these opportunities for greater account-
ability and public control.
8 CONCLUSION
The fundamental limitations of algorithmic systems and their dis-
parate performance by race and gender are the subject of increasing
scholarly scrutiny. In contrast, only limited or superficial renditions
of these debates are communicated to the broader public. Our work
presents an initial step to extend awareness and understanding of
algorithmic harm to non-specialists through an accessible, interac-
tive demo that illustrates the disparate impact of inaccuracy and
the uncertainty abound in facial recognition systems. Through the
broader co-design process with community partners we find that
technical improvements to system fairness and accuracy should not
come in place of efforts to engender trust among community mem-
bers, particularly through empowering their own understanding
and interrogation of algorithmic systems. After an initial pilot of
the tool with community advocates in three panel sessions, we find
positive early results as to the Demo’s usefulness as an educational
tool.
Though our focus with this demo was on facial recognition, our
pedagogical approach is more broadly applicable to the commu-
nication of other concepts in algorithmic systems. We argue for
the value of creating community-based and non-specialist focused
teaching tools as a broader AI ethics community.
Demystifying algorithmic systems like facial recognition for
the public is a critical component of a broader drive towards the
responsible use of AI. Through our Face Mis-ID Demo we attempt
to narrow the gap between the knowledge available to the public
and the information in the hands of technical experts. Bridging this
gap is a necessary condition for fostering broader public agency in
navigating and challenging assessments made (all too often in high-
stakes and even life-threatening domains) by algorithmic systems.
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